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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
rendered, it is apparent that the judge of the Domestic Relations
Court of Kanawha County would be peculiarly well qualified to
determine what would be the just and proper salaries of the pro-
bation officer and the other appointees.
W. R. B., II.
CRIMINAL LAW-PRINCIPAL IN SECOND DEGREE-CONVICTION OF
ATTEMPT.-D was indicted jointly with another for forcible rape.
He was convicted of an attempt to commit rape, although the
evidence showed that he was guilty as a principal in the second
degree, if guilty of any crime. Held, reversing the lower court and
ordering a new trial, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence,
because one of the elements of an attempt, an ineffectual act taken
toward the completion of the crime, was not proved. Two judges
dissented. State v. Franklin, 79 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1953).
The question whether one indicted as a principal may be con-
victed of an attempt when the proof shows only guilt as a principal
in the second degree had never been specifically answered in this
jurisdiction. At common law it was not necessary to distinguish
between principals in the indictment. Adkins v. State, 187 Ga. 519,
1 S.E.2d 420 (1939). Accordingly, it has been the practice in this
jurisdiction not to specify the principal's degree either in the
indictment or the verdict. State v. Wamsley, 109 W. Va. 570, 156
S.E. 75 (1930). As a general principle the defendant may be con-
victed of a lesser included offense when the charge and proof sus-
tain a higher crime. State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S.E. 230
(1902); State v. Collins, 108 W. Va. 98, 150 S.E. 569 (1929); Moore
v. Lowe, 116 W. Va. 165, 180 S.E. 1 (1935). W. VA. CODE c. 62, art.
3, § 18 (Michie, 1949) specifically authorizes a conviction for al
attempt upon an indictment for a felony. Thus, it would seem
that the instant case is drawing a narrow distinction in holding
that a principal in the second degree may not be convicted of an
attempt. The principal offender may be convicted of the attempt,
see State v. Collins, supra, even though the proof shows the com-
pleted crime, because in legal theory the attempt is included in
the consummated crime.
The holdings of the cases cited above indicate an effort to
bring our law into conformity with other jurisdictions wherein the
distinctions betwen principals and accessories before the fact have
been abolished for all purposes. People v. Ah Gee, 37 Cal. App. I:
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174 Pac. 371 (1918); People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786
(1925); 35 STAT. 1152 (1909), 18 U.S.C. 550 (1946). In the New
York case confederacy in crime was assimilated under the statute to
the principal-agent relationship. Other authorities have stated
that the distinctions between principals in the first and second de-
grees have almost universally been obliterated. WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAW § 239 (12th ed. 1932). The purpose of the distinctions at
common law between principals and accessories was to reduce the
number of capital convictions as the number of statutory offenses
grew. Accessories before the fact were punishable by death. PERKINS,
CASES 8C MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW S PROCEDURE 288 (1952). In
a misdemeanor all were principals. Uhl v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt.
706 (Va. 1849). No significant distinctions were made as between
the principals in the first and second degrees. Neither failure to
prosecute nor the acquittal of the principal in the first degree barred
proceedings against the principal in the second degree. State v.
Phillips, 24 Mo. 475 (1857). The latter could even be convicted of
a higher degree of crime. 1 East P.C. 350 (1803).
By statute in West Virginia it has been provided since 1849
that accessories before the fact shall be punishable as the principal
felon, and since 1894 that they may be tried in the county wherein
the principal's act occurred. W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 11, §§ 6, 7
(Michie, 1949). Nothing is said of the indictment and conviction
of a principal in the second degree and presumably the common
law which made no discrimination between principals has re-
mained intact. State v. Wamsley, supra. In State. v. Roberts, 50
W. Va. 422, 40 S.E. 484 (1901), it was asserted that a person in-
dicted as a principal could not be convicted as an accessory. The
statute being silent as to the permissible form of indictment and
conviction of an accessory, the technical common law requirements
were regarded as still persisting. Nevertheless, Moore v. Lowe,
supra, is difficult to reconcile with the Roberts case, see Comment,
42 W. VA. L.Q. 67 (1935), and as indicated above follows the
trend in other jurisdictions to abolish completely the distinctions
between parties to crime.
Aside from the unexpected view of the court in the principal
case that real differences between parties to crime persist in West
Virginia, the court held that no attempt to commit the crime
charged was proved. Thus, the verdict was not consistent with
the evidence. While logically this is correct, the holding may be
questioned. It amounts to a refusal to recognize the real intention
of the jury, and exaggerates the importance of the form of the
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verdict. The jury believes the evidence, yet wishes to reduce the
punishment for the crime. Admittedly, this is a technical error,
see State v. Prater, supra, but the appellate court should sustain
the verdict, because the defendant has not been prejudiced. The
argument that the appellate court is making itself the final arbiter
of the facts in resolving the issue of prejudice may be answered.
Although the jury either expressly or impliedly acquits the de-
fendant of the higher crime by finding him guilty of the lower
offense, there is no true acquittal. At best, a conditional acquittal
occurs. That is, the evidence proving guilt of the consummated
crime is rejected by the jury on condition, so to speak, that it may
be used to sustain the verdict of guilty of the lesser crime.
In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932), Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that consistency in the verdict was not necessary,
and quoted from Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.
1925), which said, "The most that can be said in such cases is that
... the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not
show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt."
The instant case does not involve the unwarranted finding of
the substantive elements of an attempt to commit crime. By means
of a verdict in improper form, the jury has simply reduced the
penalty for the crime which the proof shows. The defendant has
not been prejudiced and therefore should not be heard to complain.
R. L. DeP.
EVIDENCE-OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL SEARCH-ADMISsIBILITY TO
DISCREDIT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY.-D, at his trial on a charge for
sales of narcotics, testified on direct examination that he had never
sold or possessed narcotics. On cross-examination he reiterated
these assertions. The government then introduced evidence that
in connection with an earlier proceeding a heroin capsule had been
found in his possession. Over D's objection that the heroin capsule
had been obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, the
trial judge admitted this evidence. Held, on certiorari, affirming
the lower court, that evidence so obtained is admissible to impeach
D's testimony given on direct examination. Walder v. United
States, 74 Sup. Ct. 354 (1954).
The sole issue which was presented in this case was whether
the defendant's assertion on direct examination that he had never
possessed any narcotics, opened the door, solely for the purpose of
attacking the defendant's credibility, to evidence of the heroin un-
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